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Treaty rights, the Indian Act,
and the Canadian Constitution:
The Supreme Court’s 1999 decisions
BY KENT McNEIL
Kent McNeil teaches law at Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University.
In 1999 the Supreme Court’s constitu-tional decisions involving Aboriginal
peoples related to treaty rights and the
validity and effect of certain provisions
of the Indian Act.1 Two substantive deci-
sions were handed down in each of
these areas. We will start by examining
the treaty cases, and then analyze the
cases involving the Indian Act.
THE TREATY RIGHTS CASES
Both treaty cases involved the interpre-
tation of treaty provisions relating to
hunting and fishing rights. In R. v. Sun-
down,2 John Sundown was charged
with violating provisions of the Sas-
katchewan Parks Regulations, 1991,3
because he had cut down white spruce
trees and used them to build a cabin in
Meadow Lake Provincial Park without
provincial consent. His defence was
that he had a treaty right to hunt and fish
in the park, and that the cabin was nec-
essary for shelter while he was on hunt-
ing and fishing expeditions, and for
smoking fish and meat and preparing
hides. He relied on the following provi-
sion of Treaty 6, entered into in 1876,
and adhered to in 1913 by the Joseph
Bighead First Nation of Cree Indians, of
which Mr. Sundown is a member:
Her Majesty further agrees with Her
said Indians that they, the said Indi-
ans, shall have right to pursue their
avocations of hunting and fishing
throughout the tract surrendered as
hereinbefore described, subject to
such regulations as may from time
to time be made by Her Government
of Her Dominion of Canada, and
saving and excepting such tracts as
may from time to time be required
or taken up for settlement, mining,
lumbering or other purposes by Her
said Government of the Dominion
of Canada, or by any of the subjects
thereof duly authorized therefor by
the said government.4
This provision was modified in 1930
by paragraph 12 of the Natural Resources
Transfer Agreement,5 which took away
the treaty right to hunt commercially but
expanded the geographical area in
which the right to hunt for food could
be exercised.6 This modified treaty right
was given additional constitutional pro-
tection by s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982,7 which provides that “[t]he
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of
the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.”8
The Crown accepted that Mr. Sun-
down had a treaty right to hunt for food
in the park, but contended that the right
did not include a right to build a cabin to
facilitate hunting. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Delivering the unanimous
judgment, Cory J. held that building shel-
ters was “reasonably incidental” to the
right to hunt and fish, given that the
Joseph Bighead First Nation’s traditional
method of hunting was “expeditionary”—
that is, the hunters would set up a base
camp for up to two weeks, from which
they would go out in various directions to
hunt each day, returning to the camp to
dress and preserve the game and fish
they caught. This method of hunting re-
quires a shelter, originally a moss-cov-
ered lean-to, later a tent, and today a
small cabin. This evolution of the kind of
shelter was, Cory held, consistent with
the Supreme Court’s rejection of a “fro-
zen-in-time” approach to Aboriginal and
treaty rights.9 Moreover, construction of
a cabin would not give the First Nation a
proprietary interest in park land. For one
reason, if hunting became incompatible
with the Crown’s use of the land then
hunting would not be allowed, and so
any rights in the hunting cabin would be
lost, especially as the treaty itself limits
the hunting right to lands not “required
or taken up for settlement.” Furthermore,
in accordance with the Sparrow test the
treaty right to hunt would be subject to
justifiable regulation for conservation, in-
cluding restrictions on the building of
cabins if required to preserve habitat.10
However, Cory emphasized that, for the
infringement to be justifiable, “both the
purpose of the regulations and the ac-
commodation of the treaty right in issue
would have to be clear from the legisla-
tion.”11 He continued:
The Crown would also have to dem-
onstrate that the legislation does not
The Crown accepted
that Mr. Sundown
had a treaty right to
hunt for food in the
park, but contended
that the right did not
include a right to build
a cabin to facilitate
hunting. The Supreme
Court disagreed.
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unduly impair treaty rights. The sol-
emn promises of the treaty must be
fairly interpreted and the honour of
the Crown upheld. Treaty rights
must not be lightly infringed. Clear
evidence of justification would be
required before that infringement
could be accepted.
Cory J. acquitted Mr. Sundown be-
cause his treaty right to hunt and fish
took precedence over provincial legis-
lation due to s. 88 of the Indian Act.12
That section makes provincial laws of
general application apply to “Indians”
(as defined in the Act), subject to,
among other things, “the terms of any
treaty.” As the provisions of the Sas-
katchewan Parks Regulations under
which Mr. Sundown had been charged
conflicted with his treaty right, s. 88
prevented them from applying to him
when exercising that right. Cory there-
fore found it unnecessary to consider
whether s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982 would have made the provin-
cial regulations constitutionally inap-
plicable in the circumstances.
At the end of his judgment, Cory ob-
served that the Crown, in oral argument
but not in its factum, had briefly con-
tended that the justification test should
apply to allow provincial infringements
of treaty rights in the context of s. 88 of
the Indian Act, as in the context of
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
The matter had been raised, but left un-
resolved, by Lamer C.J. in R. v. Côté.13
While considering the issue to be “im-
portant,” Cory also declined to decide
it, as there had not been “any significant
argument” on it.14 What is puzzling
about this aspect of Cory’s judgment is
that, as we have seen, he did suggest
that Mr. Sundown’s treaty right to hunt
could be infringed by provincial legisla-
tion if the infringement could be justi-
fied. But given that he held the right to
be protected against provincial laws by
s. 88, how could infringement occur if
there is no justification test implicit in
s. 88?15 This conundrum aside, my own
view is that the Court should refrain
from reading a justification test into
s. 88, as, unlike s. 35(1), this is a mere
statutory provision that can be amended
by Parliament to include a justification
test if that is thought to be desirable.16
While from one perspective it may
seem odd that a statute provides more
protection to treaty rights than an ex-
press recognition and affirmation of
those rights in the Canadian constitu-
tion, where constitutional rights are
concerned the courts tend to balance
constitutional protection against parlia-
mentary sovereignty.17 That balancing
exercise is unnecessary in the case of
statutory provisions that do not raise
constitutional issues, as in that context
the courts defer to the wisdom of the
legislature.18
The Sundown decision also affirmed
and applied principles for the interpreta-
tion of treaties that have been repeated
by the Supreme Court on numerous oc-
casions. Cory J. quoted the following
summary of these principles from his
own judgment in the Badger decision:
First, it must be remembered that a
treaty represents an exchange of
solemn promises between the
Crown and the various Indian na-
tions. It is an agreement whose na-
ture is sacred. . . . Second, the hon-
our of the Crown is always at stake
in its dealing with Indian people. In-
terpretations of treaties and statu-
tory provisions which have an im-
pact upon treaty or aboriginal rights
must be approached in a manner
which maintains the integrity of the
Crown. It is always assumed that the
Crown intends to fulfil its promises.
No appearance of “sharp dealing”
will be sanctioned. . . . Third, any
ambiguities or doubtful expressions
in the wording of the treaty or docu-
ment must be resolved in favour of
the Indians. A corollary to this prin-
ciple is that any limitations which re-
strict the rights of Indians under
treaties must be narrowly con-
strued. . . . Fourth, the onus of prov-
ing that a treaty or aboriginal right
has been extinguished lies upon the
Crown. There must be “strict proof
of the fact of extinguishment” and
evidence of a clear and plain inten-
tion on the part of the government
to extinguish treaty rights.19
These principles figured prominently
in the second Supreme Court case in
1999 involving treaty rights, R. v. Marsh-
all. The Marshall case actually resulted
in two decisions, the first on the merits
(hereinafter Marshall No. 120) and the
second on an application for a rehear-
ing and a stay of judgment (hereinafter
Marshall No. 221). We will consider
each of these decisions in turn.
The Marshall  case arose out of
charges laid against Donald Marshall
Jr., a Mi’kmaq Indian, for using illegal
nets to catch eels in Nova Scotia during
the closed season and selling them
without a licence, contrary to regula-
tions made pursuant to the federal Fish-
eries Act.22 His defence was based on a
series of similar treaties entered into by
the Crown and the Mi’kmaq villages in
Nova Scotia in 1760-61, which contained
Where Indian treaties are concerned,
extrinsic evidence can be used, even if
the written document purports to contain
all the terms, to show the historical
and cultural context so as to reveal
the common intention of the parties.
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a commitment by the Mi’kmaq parties
which was expressed in one of the trea-
ties in this way:
And I do further engage that we will
not traffick, barter or Exchange any
Commodities in any manner but
with such persons or the managers
of such Truck houses as shall be ap-
pointed or Established by His Majes-
ty’s Governor at Lunenbourg or Else-
where in Nova Scotia or Acadia.23
Mr. Marshall argued that this provi-
sion incorporated both a right to engage
in traditional hunting, fishing, and gath-
ering, and a right to trade the products
of those activities.
Mr. Justice Binnie, delivering the
judgment of the majority of the Su-
preme Court in Marshall No. 1,24 ac-
cepted this argument, but limited the
right to trade to a right to secure “neces-
saries,” which he construed in today’s
world as “equivalent to a moderate live-
lihood.”25 Because Mr. Marshall had
been “engaged in a small-scale com-
mercial activity to help subsidize or sup-
port himself and his common-law
spouse” (the price received for the eels
was $787.10), Binnie J. held that he had
been exercising his treaty right.26 As
that right is protected by s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982,27 and the Crown
had made no attempt to justify infringe-
ment of the right by the fisheries regula-
tions, Mr. Marshall was acquitted.
An important aspect of the Marshall
No. 1 decision was the court’s use of
extrinsic evidence to determine the
terms of the treaties. Binnie J. rejected
the suggestion made, but not applied,
by Estey J. in R. v. Horse28 that extrinsic
evidence cannot be used where the
written terms are unambiguous. As
Binnie pointed out, the Supreme Court
has distanced itself from Estey’s views
in a number of more recent decisions.29
Moreover, extrinsic evidence can be
used even in a modern commercial
context to show that a written contract
does not contain all the terms.30 Where
Indian treaties are concerned, extrinsic
evidence can be used, even if the writ-
ten document purports to contain all
the terms, to show the historical and
cultural context so as to reveal the com-
mon intention of the parties.31 Also,
where a treaty was concluded verbally
and then written down by the Crown’s
representatives, “it would be uncon-
scionable,” Binnie said, “for the Crown
to ignore the oral terms while relying on
the written terms.”32
Binnie J. reached his conclusion that
the treaties included a right to hunt, fish,
and gather, and to trade the products of
those activities for necessaries, by exam-
ining the historical context and the
record of negotiations of the treaties.
Cape Breton Island and Quebec had
been taken from the French by the British
in 1759, and Montreal fell in June, 1760.
The British were anxious to maintain
peace with the Mi’kmaq, who had been
allies of the French and who could be
formidable opponents. The British also
wanted the Mi’kmaq to continue their tra-
ditional economies so they would not
become discontented and would not be-
come a burden on the public purse.
Moreover, when the treaties were en-
tered into, the Aboriginal leaders asked
for truckhouses (trading posts) where
they could bring their goods to exchange
for the European goods on which they
had become dependent. As Binnie ob-
served, “[i]t cannot be supposed that the
Mi’kmaq raised the subject of trade con-
cessions merely for the purpose of sub-
jecting themselves to a trade restric-
tion.”33 He concluded:
The trade clause would not have ad-
vanced British objectives (peaceful
relations with a self-sufficient
Mi’kmaq people) or Mi’kmaq objec-
tives (access to the European “nec-
essaries” on which they had come
to rely) unless the Mi’kmaq were as-
sured at the same time of continuing
access, implicitly or explicitly, to
wildlife to trade.34
Moreover, the honour of the Crown
is always involved in its dealings with
the Aboriginal peoples. Binnie did not
think that “an interpretation of events
that turns a positive Mi’kmaq trade de-
mand into a negative Mi’kmaq covenant
is consistent with the honour and integ-
rity of the Crown.”35
Addressing the Crown’s concern
that “recognition of the existence of a
constitutionally entrenched right with,
as here, a trading aspect, would open
the floodgates to uncontrollable and ex-
cessive exploitation of the natural re-
sources,” Binnie repeated that the right
was limited to a right to trade for neces-
saries, which in a modern context
means for a moderate livelihood. Ex-
panding on this, he said this:
A moderate livelihood includes such
basics as “food, clothing and housing,
supplemented by a few amenities,”
but not the accumulation of wealth.
. . . It addresses day-to-day needs.
Government regulations limiting
Mi’kmaq hunting and fishing to what is
required for a moderate livelihood
would not violate their treaty right, and
so would not have to be justified. But
regulations that went beyond that and
infringed their right to derive a moder-
ate livelihood from those ac tivities
would have to be justified in accordance
with the Sparrow test.
As is well known, Marshall No. 1
sparked not only controversy, but also
turmoil in the Atlantic fisheries.
Mi’kmaq fishers naturally interpreted
the decision as affirming their treaty
right to fish not just eels, but other spe-
cies as well, for a moderate livelihood.
They accordingly began to trap lobsters
for that purpose without respecting fed-
eral regulations designed to control the
lobster fishery. The federal government
was apparently unprepared and did not
seem to have any policy in place to deal
with the situation. In the meantime,
some non-Aboriginal fishers reacted
angrily, resorting in some instances to
property damage and other violent acts
that the police apparently did little to
prevent or stop. In my opinion, this
Treaty rights continued from page 45
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amounted to a disgraceful failure by
both private citizens and government
officials to respect the rule of law where
the constitutional rights of Aboriginal
peoples are concerned.
In the judicial forum, one of the
intervenors in Marshall No. 1, the West
Nova Fishermen’s Coalition, applied to
the Supreme Court for a rehearing of
the case and an order staying the
court’s judgment in the meantime. The
result was Marshall No. 2. In it the
court, speaking unanimously, not only
dismissed the application, but also pro-
vided clarification of its earlier judg-
ment. While Marshall No. 2 contains
interesting comments on the status of
an intervenor to bring such an applica-
tion, we will limit our discussion to the
court’s clarification of Marshall No. 1.
In Marshall No. 2, the court specified
that its earlier judgment dealt only with
the treaty right to
fish, wildlife and traditionally gathered
things such as fruits and berries. The
word “gathering” in the September
17, 1999, majority judgment was used
in connection with the types of re-
sources traditionally “gathered” in an
Aboriginal economy and which were
thus reasonably in the contemplation
of the parties to the 1760-61 treaties.
Accordingly, the earlier judgment did
not decide whether the Mi’kmaq have
any rights to “gather” other resources,
such as timber, minerals, and oil and
gas. The court nonetheless observed:
It is of course open to Native commu-
nities to assert broader treaty rights
in that regard, but if so, the basis for
such a claim will have to be estab-
lished in proceedings where the is-
sue is squarely raised on proper his-
torical evidence, as was done in this
case in relation to fish and wildlife.
The rest of the Marshall No. 2 judg-
ment relates mainly to legislative author-
ity to regulate the Mi’kmaq’s treaty right.
After quoting several passages from its
earlier judgment, the court concluded:
The Court was thus most explicit in
confirming the regulatory authority
of the federal and provincial govern-
ments within their respective legisla-
tive fields to regulate the exercise of
the treaty right subject to the consti-
tutional requirement that restraints
on the exercise of the treaty right
have to be justified on the basis of
conservation or other compelling
and substantial public objectives.
The court pointed out that the issue
of what regulations might be justifiable
was not dealt with in Marshall No. 1 be-
cause the Crown made no attempt to
justify the application to Mr. Marshall of
the fisheries regulations under which he
had been charged. Moreover, the issue
of justification cannot be determined
apart from a specific context. For exam-
ple, even if the court were to determine
that a closed season was justified for the
eel fishery, that would not mean that a
closed season for the lobster fishery
would be justified.
The court nonetheless went on to re-
iterate that, as the treaty right in ques-
tion is limited to providing a moderate
livelihood, regulations restricting it to
that purpose would not infringe it and
so would not require justification. The
court continued:
Other limitations apparent in the
September 17, 1999, majority judg-
ment include the local nature of
treaties, the communal nature of a
treaty right, and the fact it was only
hunting and fishing resources to
which access was affirmed, together
with traditionally gathered things
like wild fruit and berries.
The rather cryptic reference to “the
communal nature of a treaty right” in
this passage is significant, as it appears
to relate to an earlier observation in the
judgment that “the treaty rights do not
belong to the individual, but are exer-
cised by authority of the local commu-
nity to which the accused belongs.” If
the communal nature of a treaty right is
a limitation on the right, then as the em-
phasized words reveal it is a limitation
that is under the authority of the com-
munity in which the right is vested. This
seems to mean that the community has
the authority to determine, and if neces-
sary to limit, how the right is exercised
by its members. If this is correct, then a
communal right of self-government with
respect to the exercise of treaty rights
appears to be implicit in the court’s
judgment.36
On the extent of the legislative au-
thority to regulate the treaty right, the
court referred to the general principles
laid down in its earlier decisions, espe-
cially R. v. Sparrow,37 R. v. Badger,38
and R. v. Gladstone.39 The court distin-
guished, however, between situations
involving Aboriginal rights, which “by
definition [were] exercised exclusively
by Aboriginal people prior to contact
with Europeans,” and a treaty right like
the one at issue, which was never exclu-
The problem with the court’s reasoning in
this respect is that the treaty rights of the
Mi’kmaq to fish are constitutionally
protected, whereas any rights
non-Aboriginal Canadians may have
to participate in the fishery are not. Since
when can rights that are not constitutionally
protected trump those that are?
Treaty rights, page 48
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sive because, at the time the treaty was
entered into, non-Aboriginal people
were already participating in the com-
mercial and recreational fisheries.40 Ac-
cordingly, the court said that infringe-
ment of the treaty right could be justi-
fied, not only for conservation, but also
to take account of non-Aboriginal par-
ticipation. In that context, the court ob-
served that “[p]roportionality is an im-
portant factor.”41 Moreover, as held in
previous cases, consultation with the
Aboriginal peoples whose constitu-
tional rights are infringed is an impor-
tant aspect of the justification test.42
In reaching its conclusion that the
treaty right to catch and trade fish to ob-
tain a moderate livelihood can be in-
fringed to take account of other partici-
pants in the fishery, the court in fact went
beyond Gladstone. In that case the
Heiltsuk Nation in British Columbia
proved an Aboriginal right to take herring
spawn on kelp in commercial quantities.
Lamer C.J., for the majority, held that
valid legislative objectives for infringe-
ment of that right are not limited to con-
servation, and can include “the recogni-
tion of the historical reliance upon, and
participation in, the fishery by non-Abo-
riginal groups.”43 However, in Gladstone
the Chief Justice explained that the rea-
son why the Heiltsuks’ right to herring
spawn does not have complete priority
over non-Aboriginal fishing is that, unlike
the right to fish for food in Sparrow,44 the
Heiltsuks’ right has no internal limit be-
cause it is commercial in nature. But like
the right in Sparrow, the right to fish in
the Marshall case does have an internal
limit because only so many fish are re-
quired for a moderate livelihood. The
court’s conclusion in Marshall No. 2
that, given that non-Aboriginal people
were participating in the fishery at the
time the right was created, the Mi’kmaq’s
treaty right to fish has never been exclu-
sive, is not a convincing explanation for
allowing infringement of the right today
for the purpose of taking the participa-
tion of non-Aboriginal fishers into ac-
count. The problem with the court’s rea-
soning in this respect is that the treaty
rights of the Mi’kmaq to fish are constitu-
tionally protected, whereas any rights
non-Aboriginal Canadians may have to
participate in the fishery are not. Since
when can rights that are not constitution-
ally protected trump those that are?45
THE INDIAN ACT CASES
While the Marshall case obviously at-
tracted the most attention last year, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Corbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and North-
ern Affairs)46 is probably much more im-
portant, in terms of both its practical and
its constitutional significance.
Corbiere involved a direct challenge
to a provision of the Indian Act47 dealing
with qualifications to vote for the chief
and councillors of a band. Section
77(1) provides:
77.(1) A member of a band who
has attained the age of eighteen
years and is ordinarily resident on
the reserve is qualified to vote for a
person nominated to be chief of the
band and, where the reserve for vot-
ing purposes consists of one sec-
tion, to vote for persons nominated
as councillors.
Certain members of the Batchewana
Indian Band in Ontario brought the ac-
tion, on behalf of themselves and all
non-resident members, alleging that
s. 77(1) violates s. 15(1) of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,48
cannot be justified under s. 1 of the
Charter, and is therefore constitution-
ally invalid. The facts revealed that 67.2
percent of Batchewana Band members
lived off reserve in 1991. Between 1985
and 1991 the numbers of non-resident
members had risen dramatically, mainly
as a result of Bill C-31,49 which conferred
Indian status on persons who had lost
or were being denied it as a result of dis-
criminatory provisions that were previ-
ously in the Indian Act.50 This trend to-
ward non-residency is continuing.51
Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé de-
livered a judgment that was concurred
in by Gonthier, Iacobucci, and Binnie
JJ. McLachlin and Bastarache JJ.,
Lamer C.J., Cory and Major JJ. concur-
ring, also delivered a judgment arriving
at the same result, but with some differ-
ences in reasoning. As L’Heureux-
Dubé’s judgment contains a more de-
tailed analysis, and was concurred in on
some points by McLachlin and Bastar-
ache, we will look at it first.
L’Heureux-Dubé started by examin-
ing the preliminary issue of whether the
s. 15(1) analysis should be limited to
the application of s. 77(1) to the
Batchewana Band, or deal more gener-
ally with the application of s. 77(1) to all
bands affected by it. She decided that
the proper approach was to determine
first whether s. 77(1) is unconstitutional
in its general application. Only if the an-
swer to this question is no would it be
necessary to consider whether the sec-
tion’s application to the Batchewana
Band specifically is unconstitutional,
given their special circumstances.52
One of the intervenors, the Lesser
Slave Lake Indian Regional Council, ar-
gued that s. 25 of the Charter shields
s. 77(1) from s. 15(1). Section 25 pro-
vides:
25. The guarantee in this Charter
of certain rights and freedoms shall
not be construed so as to abrogate
or derogate from any aboriginal,
treaty or other rights or freedoms
that pertain to the aboriginal peo-
ples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that
have been recognized by the
Royal Proclamation of October 7,
1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms
that now exist by way of land
claims agreements or may be so
acquired.
L’Heureux-Dubé held that, while
“rights or freedoms” in s. 25 is broader
than “aboriginal and treaty rights” in
s. 35,53 and so may include statutory
rights, it had not been shown that
s. 77(1) provides rights or freedoms that
come under the protection of s. 25. In
Treaty rights continued from page 47
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her words, “the fact that legislation re-
lates to Aboriginal people cannot alone
bring it within the scope of the ‘other
rights and freedoms’ included in
s. 25.”54 Moreover, because s. 25 had
not been shown to apply, she said that it
would be inappropriate to articulate, in
this case, a general approach to s. 25.
The Corbiere decision therefore left
some very important issues in relation
to s. 25 undecided.55
Turning to s. 15(1) of the Charter,
L’Heureux-Dubé proceeded through the
three-stage analysis set out by Iacobucci
J. in Law v. Canada (Minister of Em-
ployment and Immigration).56 She had
no difficulty concluding that the first re-
quirement—namely, differential treat-
ment—was present because s. 77(1)
“draws a distinction between band
members who live on-reserve and those
who live off-reserve, by excluding the
latter from the definition of ‘elector’
within the band.”57 Although this dis-
tinction based on reserve residency is
not an “enumerated ground” under
s. 15(1), she found it to be a new “analo-
gous ground,” thereby meeting the sec-
ond stage of the Law analysis.
However, while concluding that “off-
reserve band member status” is an
analogous ground not only insofar as
s. 77(1) is concerned, but also “in any
future case involving this combination
of traits,” L’Heureux-Dubé was careful
not to make any “findings about ‘resi-
dence’ as an analogous ground in con-
texts other than as it affects band mem-
bers who do not live on the reserve of
the band to which they belong.”
Proceeding to the third stage of the
Law analysis—namely, the requirement
that the differential treatment be dis-
criminatory—L’Heureux-Dubé found
that it was in this case. After detailed ex-
amination of this issue, she summa-
rized her reasons in a manner that drew
on her analysis at the second stage:
The people affected by this distinc-
tion, in general, are vulnerable and
disadvantaged. They experience
stereotyping and disadvantage as
Aboriginal people and band mem-
bers living away from reserves.
They form part of a “discrete and in-
sular minority” defined by race and
residence, and it is more likely that
further disadvantage will have a
discriminatory impact upon them.
Second, the distinction in question
does not correspond with the char-
acteristics or circumstances of the
claimants and on-reserve band
members in a manner which “re-
spects and values their dignity and
difference”: Law, supra, at para.
28. . . . Third, the nature of the inter-
ests affected is fundamental.
However, L’Heureux-Dubé added
that her analysis at this third stage “does
not suggest that any distinction between
on-reserve and off-reserve band mem-
bers would be stereotypical, interfere
with off-reser ve members’ dignity, or
conflict with the purposes of s. 15(1).”58
She pointed out that Parliament could
legitimately treat on and off reserve
members differently in situations where
that is appropriate—for example, where
matters of purely local concern such as
taxation on reserve or regulation of traf-
fic are concerned.
L’Heureux-Dubé accordingly con-
cluded that s. 77(1) violates the right to
equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter.
Moreover, she held that this conclusion
applies generally; it is not related to the
specific circumstances of the Batche-
wana Band. She then considered
whether the violation could be justified
under s. 1 of the Charter. She found that
the legislative objective behind
s. 77(1)—namely, that “those with the
most immediate and direct connection
with the reserve have a special ability to
control its future”—is pressing and sub-
stantial, as required by the first part of
the s. 1 analysis.59 Turning to the sec-
ond part of that analysis, she found a ra-
tional connection between that objec-
tive and restricting voting to reserve resi-
dents, as members living on reserve
have a more direct interest in many of a
band council’s functions than those liv-
ing off reserve. However, the minimal
impairment requirement in the s. 1
analysis was not met by s. 77(1), as it
was not shown that “a complete exclu-
sion of non-residents from the right to
vote, which violates their equality
rights,” was necessary to give effect to
the valid legislative objective.60
As the violation of s. 15(1) had not
been justified under s. 1, L’Heureux-
Dubé found s. 77(1) to be unconstitu-
tional insofar as it denies voting rights to
non-resident band members.
She then turned to the matter of the
appropriate remedy. She decided first of
all that a constitutional exemption that
would exempt only the Batchewana
Band from application of the unconsti-
tutional portion of s. 77(1) was not ap-
propriate, given that the invalidity ap-
plied generally to all bands. Nor would it
be appropriate for the court to “read in”
voting rights for non-residents, as that
would require a detailed scheme that
would allow them to be voters for some
purposes but not o thers. Instead,
L’Heureux-Dubé concluded that “the
appropriate remedy is a declaration that
the words ‘and is ordinarily resident on
the reserve’ in s. 77(1) are invalid, and
that the effect of this declaration of inva-
lidity be suspended for 18 months.” The
suspension was to give the Canadian
government time to consult with the
people affected and to respond to their
needs in a way that respects equality
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If resident band members can avoid
taxation while non-resident band members
cannot, this situation would seem to fall
within the new analogous ground
the court created in Corbiere.
rights, and to give Parliament an oppor-
tunity to modify s. 77(2) as well, which,
L’Heureux-Dubé suggested, suffers from
the same constitutional defect.61
McLachlin and Bastarache JJ., in
their judgment in Corbiere, agreed with
L’Heureux-Dubé that s. 77(1) violates
s. 15(1) of the Charter because it “makes
a distinction that denies equal benefit or
imposes an unequal burden” in a way
that discriminates on an analogous
ground.62 However, they emphasized
that once accepted by the cour t, an
analogous ground, like an enumerated
ground, will always be a marker of dis-
crimination, though legislation that dis-
tinguishes on that ground will not nec-
essarily be discriminatory—that depends
on the context.
Accordingly, they said, “if ‘Aborigin-
ality-residence’ is to be an analogous
ground (and we agree with L’Heureux-
Dubé J. that it should), then it must al-
ways stand as a constant marker of po-
tential legislative discrimination,
whether the challenge is to a govern-
mental tax credit, a voting right, or a
pension scheme.”63 However, one still
has to determine “whether the distinc-
tion amounts, in purpose or effect, to
discrimination on the facts of the case.”
Like L’Heureux-Dubé, McLachlin and
Bastarache concluded that s. 77(1) dis-
criminates against non-resident band
members generally.
Having concluded that the residency
requirement in s. 77(1) violates s. 15(1)
of the Charter, McLachlin and Bastar-
ache considered the application of s. 1.
Like L’Heureux-Dubé, they found a ra-
tional connection between the objec-
tive of the legislation and residency, but
like her concluded that the requirement
of minimal impairment had not been
met. “Even if it is accepted that some
distinction may be justified in order to
protect legitimate interests of band
members living on the reserve,” they
said, “it has not been demonstrated that
a complete denial of the right of band
members living off-reser ve to partici-
pate in the affairs of the band through
the democratic process of elections is
necessary.” Accordingly, they found
that the violation of s. 15(1) equality
rights had not been justified. They
agreed that the appropriate remedy was
to declare the words “and is ordinarily
resident on the reserve” in s. 77(1) to
be constitutionally invalid, but sus-
pended the implementation of that dec-
laration for 18 months.
The Corbiere decision will have a
dramatic effect on band council govern-
ments under the Indian Act. In First Na-
tions like the Batchewana Indian Band,
where a majority of band members live
off reserve, the extension of even lim-
ited voting rights to those non-resident
members will have a significant impact
on the politics and the power structure
in those communities. Whether the de-
cision will affect Aboriginal govern-
ments established outside the confines
of the Indian Act remains to be seen. In
both judgments in the Supreme Court,
the justices suggested that it would be
open to individual First Nations to
present evidence that they have an ex-
isting Aboriginal right to restrict voting
rights. While these observations were
made in the context of the Indian Act
electoral provisions, they indicate that
the Court is of the opinion that there
may be Aboriginal rights in relation to
governance that can take precedence
over the statutory regime in the Act.64
This may be an indication, like the refer-
ences to communal rights and Aborigi-
nal decision-making authorit y in
Marshall No. 2 and Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia,65 that the Court will
be open to claims to Aboriginal govern-
ance rights in the future.66
The Corbiere decision also casts
doubt on the constitutionality of other
provisions of the Indian Act that make
distinctions related to residency on re-
serves. For example, s. 87(1) exempts
reserve lands and personal property of
Indians and Indian bands situated on
reserves from taxation. Given that the
Supreme Court has held that reserve
residency is an analogous ground un-
der s. 15(1) of the Charter, this provi-
sion is now open to question, as the im-
position of some taxes, like sales tax,
can depend on residency in this con-
text. If resident band members can
avoid taxation while non-resident band
members cannot, this situation would
seem to fall within the new analogous
ground the court created in Corbiere. If
so, it would be up to a court to decide if
this differential treatment is discrimina-
tory in the circumstances.
Finally, there is the issue of services,
such as health care, provided by the fed-
eral government to band members who
reside on reserves, but generally denied
by that government to non-resident
band members. In a federal govern-
ment “Backgrounder” on the Corbiere
decision, this statement appears:
The Court was very clear that its de-
cision relates only to the constitu-
tionality of voting distinctions. It
does not address any other issues,
such as the extension of entitle-
ments to off-reserve Band members
or issues of federal or provincial ju-
risdiction.67
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However, while the court did not ad-
dress matters like the constitutionality
of differential provision of services, it
did hold that reserve residency is now
an analogous ground for all purposes.
Thus, the question whether provision
of services on the basis of reserve resi-
dency is constitutional should depend,
like the voting rights in Corbiere, on
whether that is discriminatory. If I were
advising the federal government, I do
not think I would be overly confident
about the answer.
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